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Abstract: In this paper, we consider a model of on-the-job learning where workers learn 
informally by watching and imitating colleagues. We estimate the rate of knowledge diffusion 
inside the firm using three matched worker-firm data sets from Benin, Morocco and Senegal. 
We rely on non-linear least squares to estimate the structural parameters of the informal 
learning model and account for unobserved firm heterogeneity using firm factors derived 
from a principal component analysis. We find that the rate of knowledge diffusion is around 7 
percent in Morocco and Senegal and much higher in Benin, but part of the learning-by-
watching returns stems from firm heterogeneity. Informal training significantly affects the 
shape of returns to tenure in African countries. Finally, we estimate an extended model with 
both learning-by-watching and learning-by-doing and find significant benefits from imitating 
colleagues in Morocco. 
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1. Introduction 
Within the academic literature in sociology, there has been a growing interest in 
workplaces as learning environments and the importance of on-the-job learning in skill 
formation processes (Garrick, 1998, Boud and Garrick, 1999). In particular, many workplace 
learning processes are variously described as ‘informal’ or ‘nonformal’ (Billett, 2001, Colley 
et alii, 2003, Hayward and James, 2004). The perceived importance of informal processes in 
workplace learning is captured by Coffield’s image of the learning iceberg (2000, p. 1): “If all 
learning were to be represented by an iceberg, then the section above the surface of the water 
would be sufficient to cover formal learning, but the submerged two thirds of the structure 
would be needed to convey the much greater importance of informal learning”.  
It is important to appreciate that interest in workplace learning, through both formal 
and informal processes, is still a relatively recent phenomenon and that the evidence base 
about effective practices that lead to important labour market outcomes is still relatively 
scarce (Battu et alii, 2003). Economic research on workplace learning in economics is still in 
late infancy at best, albeit Mincer (1989) was claiming years ago that informal training may 
constitute the essential part of training provided by firms. If workplace learning, and in 
particular informal training, is as important in developing vocational knowledge and skill as 
research is beginning to suggest, then it is also important to understand the ways in which 
(and of course the extent to which) skill formation resulting from situated learning affects 
workers’ productivity and wages. 
While the benefits of investments in human capital are clearly established in the 
economic profession, the accurate calculation of rates of return to informal training remains 
complex. One reason is that the usual on-the-job training variables of are often affected by 
measurement errors. Some authors have shown that these errors are likely to bias the 
estimates of the rates of return to training (Barron et alii, 1997, Loewenstein and Spletzer, 
1999, Frazis and Loewenstein, 2005). Moreover, for reasons that are inherent in the very 
nature of informal training, the few direct measures of informal training available today in 
data sets are even more imperfect (see the discussion in Barron et alii, 1997, Loewenstein and 
Spletzer, 1999).  
 Interestingly, formal training is rather simple to measure as it is clearly identifiable. It 
is generally provided for a determined duration by a recognised trainer in a precise place. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case for informal training that appears inextricably part of the 
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employee’s productive activity (Brown, 1990). Furthermore, the modeling of a process of 
informal learning susceptible to be submitted to an empirical test requires the availability of 
micro data containing information both on workers and on their firm.  
In this contribution, we rely on three matched worker-firm data sets for Morocco, 
Benin and Senegal to assess the relevance on informal training in Africa. The first one is the 
Firm Analysis and Competitiveness Survey (FACS) conducted in 2000 by the World Bank 
and the Moroccan Ministry of Trade and Industry, which includes representative data from 
859 manufacturing plants. The worker survey collected data from 8375 workers. The two 
other matched data sets, made available very recently, stem from the Investment Climate 
Assessment (ICA) surveys conducted by the World Bank between 2001 and 2004 in the 
framework of the Africa RPED programme. The ICA surveys provide information on about 
200 firms and more than 1500 employees. 
With a method similar to that of Mincer (1974), our approach consists of estimating 
the returns to informal training using the individual earnings profiles. For that purpose, a 
structural model of on-the-job learning is developed to conform to the structure of our data. 
The first presentation of the model appears in the original work of Lévy-Garboua (1994), and 
it has been extended and successively estimated by Chennouf et alii (1997), Nordman (2000), 
Destré and Nordman (2002), Destré (2003) and Destré et alii (2007). However, the previous 
estimates suffer from limits that this paper intends to overcome.  
The model accounts for on-the-job learning. Workers learn informally on the job by 
watching others performing their tasks1. They may also learn by themselves, i.e. by a sort of 
learning-by-doing process. In a setting where gross earnings reflect human capital, it is 
straightforward to show that one can solve a wage recurrence equation after postulating that 
the knowledge diffusion process within the firm is time-invariant. The human capital of any 
given worker is expected to increase with tenure, both by learning-by-watching and learning-
by-oneself. One part of the returns to tenure is hence firm dependent. By taking the 
logarithms of the earnings equation, we find that the log of gross earnings is the sum of a 
linear-in-tenure Mincerian earnings functions and a correction function. We estimate the 
structural parameters of the model using non-linear least squares. 
We extend the previous results on the learning model in the following way. First, we 
structurally take into account a flexible form of the returns to schooling. Indeed, the previous 
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 Employees who are getting informal training may not always be conscious that they are doing so. 
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estimated model did not consider the possibility of convex returns to education (Destré et alii, 
2007). Yet, constant rates of return to education are more and more challenged in developed 
and developing countries (Card, 1999), especially in Africa2. Second, we introduce controls 
for the firm’s heterogeneity component thanks to the use of a preliminary factor analysis of 
the firms’ characteristics and show the impact of these firm factors on the structural 
parameters of the model. Finally, it matters to point out the innovative nature of our estimates 
for developing countries. To the best of our knowledge, accurate and comparative assessment 
of the impact and extent to informal on-the-job training in private firms has never been 
carried out with matched worker-firm data on Africa.  
Our empirical results show that informal learning is of importance in African firms. 
We find that the rate of knowledge diffusion is around 7% in Morocco and Senegal, while it is 
much higher in Benin. This means that in the former countries, the workers’ tenure which is 
requested to assimilate half of the firm knowledge is about 10 years. However, part of the 
learning-by-watching returns stems from firm heterogeneity. Informal training significantly 
affects the shape of returns to tenure in African countries. Intuitively, workers will assimilate 
faster a given proportion of the knowledge of the firm when there is a lot to learn by watching 
others. We evidence that the learning potential from the most qualified teacher is much lower 
in Morocco than in Benin and Senegal. Finally, we estimate the extended model with both 
learning-by-watching and learning-by-oneself and still evidence significant benefits from 
imitating colleagues in Morocco. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present the on-the-
job learning model. Section 3 describes the three matched worker-firm surveys together with 
the information collected from workers and firms respectively for Morocco, Benin and 
Senegal. In Section 4, we present the econometric strategy to recover the structural parameters 
of the model. Our results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A model of learning-by-watching 
 While economists mainly focus on formal training, workers may also improve their 
skills by learning informally, simply while being in their firm and watching other workers 
performing their tasks. Unlike formal training, this knowledge acquisition process seems not 
really costly as a firm does not have to provide specific resources for it.  
                                                 
2
 See Bigsten et alii (2000), Schultz (2004), Söderbom et alii (2006) and Kuepie et alii (2006). 
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More productive workers may not necessarily devote time to explain other workers 
how to improve their own productivity. All the training effort remains informal, in the sense 
that less productive workers are simply expected to watch those who have more knowledge 
and experience, and then to replicate what they have observed. This imitation process acts as a 
positive externality whose benefits extend over time. Workers receiving at a given time some 
informal training from others will be later in a supply position, showing in turn informally to 
new incumbents how they can enhance their own productivity. 
 For the presentation, we draw on the model of learning-by-watching first described in 
Lévy-Garboua (1994) and extended in Destré et alii (2007). Consider a competitive industry 
where wage rates are equal to the true marginal product of labour, so that earnings reflect pure 
human capital. Using a discrete-time framework, we denote by th  the amount of human 
capital for a worker at date t . Assume that the worker enters the firm at date 0, so that t  
corresponds to tenure. Then, 0h  is the value of the worker’s human capital when starting his 
activity in the firm. Each individual has presumably accumulated some experience while 
working in previous firms. Let x  be the number of working years spent outside the current 
firm, so that individual total experience is tx + .  
 In the firm, each worker is supposed to learn from colleagues who have more human 
capital than him/her. Let tH  be the highest level of human capital embodied in colleagues. 
Importantly, we assume that the firm’s knowledge is invariant, meaning that HH t = . Owing 
to the imitation process, a worker’s human capital is expected to increase over time by 
learning from others. The following equation describes the dynamics of human capital 
formation for a worker (see Lévy-Garboua, 1994): 
( )11 1 −− −+=− ttt hHn
nhh        (1) 
where n  is the rate of knowledge diffusion inside the firm. We assume that the rate of 
learning-by-watching is the same for each worker and is time-invariant for the sake of 
simplicity. For a given value of n , human capital will increase faster when the worker has a 
lot to learn from the most qualified worker. Hence, at the period t , the level of human capital 
is a weighted sum of human capital in 1−t  and of human capital of the most capable worker: 
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From the recurrence equation (2), we get the following solution for th : 
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As shown in (4), the human capital of a worker is an increasing function of the number of 
periods spent within the firm ( 0/ >∂∂ tht ). Also, we have Hhtt =∞→lim . As time goes by, the 
individual level of human capital converges towards the firm’s job-specific knowledge. In this 
model, the central interest lies in the estimation of the parameter n . 
 In the above formulation, all the job-specific information is learnt from colleagues and 
the highest level of human capital remains constant. A more realistic framework, considered 
in Destré et alii (2005) and estimated in Destré and Nordman (2002), is to assume that 
workers learn both by themselves through their own experience and by watching others3. In 
such setting, the human capital of a worker is both increasing with tenure and it converges 
towards the firm’s job-specific knowledge. However, the latter component is no longer fixed 
within the firm. Since all workers are expected to learn by themselves, the level of human 
capital of the most qualified worker is continuously growing. 
 Let g  be a measure of the impact of self-learning. The dynamics of human capital 
formation may now be expressed as: 
( )1111 1 −−−− −++=− ttttt hHn
nhghh       (5) 
By definition, there is no learning-by-watching for the most capable worker, meaning that the 
highest level of human capital will increase inside the firm only owing to self-learning. This 
implies that 1)1( −+= tt HgH . Using (5) and after some calculations, we finally deduce the 
following value for th
4: 
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 By repeating tasks within the firm, a worker is expected to improve his/her own productivity and hence human 
capital. 
4
 For a more detailed analysis, see the presentation in Destré et alii (2007). 
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Clearly, we note that when 0=g , equation (6) is equivalent to (3), which is the pure learning-
by-watching case. To end up with this formal presentation, two comments are in order.  
First, it is unclear whether the firm’s job specific knowledge tH  may really be seen as 
a moving target, increasing at steady state. Imagine a manufacturing firm, with a young 
worker and a very experienced, older worker. In a context where the technology remains 
fixed, the latter has certainly nothing more to learn even by him/herself5. As a consequence, 
we estimate first the learning-by-watching model in our empirical analysis and then examine 
the consequences of self-learning. Second, as clearly shown by (4) and (6), the expression of 
th  is a non-linear function of both g  and n . When turning to the data, we rely on non-linear 
models to recover the structural parameters of informal training. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 3.1. The matched worker-firm data 
 We estimate the previous theoretical model in a comparative context with matched 
employer-employee data collected in three different African countries, i.e. Benin, Morocco 
and Senegal. The data for Benin and Senegal stem from the Investment Climate Assessment 
(ICA) surveys conducted by the World Bank between 2001 and 2004 in the framework of the 
Africa RPED programme6. The data for Morocco come from the Firm Analysis and 
Competitiveness Survey (FACS) conducted in 2000 by the World Bank and the Moroccan 
Ministry of Trade and Industry.  
 These three surveys are based on the notion that the workplace is the microdata unit 
where labour supply and demand is resolved. In that spirit, the ICA surveys respectively 
conducted in 2004-2005 for Benin and in 2003-2004 for Senegal and FACS collected data 
both on the firm characteristics and on a sample of employees in each workplace. The survey 
instrument was then a written questionnaire addressed to both employers and employees. The 
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 In fact, the worker may even become less productive as time goes by, and could thus be concerned by a 
decrease in earnings. We rule out this possibility by assuming that there exists some downward wage rigidity. 
6
 The Africa Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) is an ongoing research project with the 
overall purpose of generating business knowledge and policy advice useful to private sector manufacturing 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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questionnaires are specifically tailored for each country, but they enable cross-country 
comparisons as they are made of very similar questions. 
 In Benin and Senegal, the firms have been randomly selected among the population of 
formal establishments and belong to the following ten sectors of production: agro-industry, 
chemicals and paints, construction materials, food, furniture, metal, paper and publishing, 
plastics, textile and leather and wood industry. There is no constraint on the size of the firms 
which were selected in the samples. Conversely, in Morocco, the focus is restricted to formal 
companies which have at least ten employees. The selected firms are in seven industries: 
electronics, textiles, garments, food, pharmaceuticals, leather and shoes products, and plastics. 
Clearly, there is less heterogeneity in the firm sample of Morocco. 
 Let us now describe more precisely the different samples7. In Senegal, a sample of 262 
manufacturing firms has been surveyed based on a sampling plan made of 1645 formal 
companies. These firms have been randomly selected using a stratification based on sector, 
size and localisation and represented 59.6% of the formal manufacturing firms in 2003 and 
68.9% of its formal permanent jobs. In Benin, a sample of 197 manufacturing firms has been 
randomly selected by stratification as well. It represented 78% of the formal manufacturing 
firms listed in 2002 and gathered 42% of the estimated formal jobs in Benin. For Morocco, 
the Moroccan Census of Manufactures was used as the establishment sampling frame, with 
1933 formal firms of more than ten employees in the seven sectors mentioned above8. The 
sample includes data from 859 manufacturing plants which are representative of the sampling 
plan in terms of employment, production and exportation.  
 The structure of the data allows building up matched worker-firm data sets. Indeed, in 
each surveyed country, up to ten employees have been randomly sampled in each firm 
following the idea advocated by Mairesse and Greenan (1999). Note that all the employees of 
small firms have been interviewed, while the sampling rate decreases with the size of the 
firms. The number of workers interviewed in Benin, Senegal and Morocco are respectively 
equal to 1781, 1645 and 8561.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Further details of the surveys and their methodology can be found in World Bank (2005a, 2005b) for Senegal 
and Benin, and in World Bank (2002) for Morocco. 
8
 A random sample of 1000 establishments and a replacement sample of 500 were drawn by industry, the choice 
of regions being dictated by the geographical concentration of firms in the selected industries. 
 9 
3.2. Descriptive statistics of the workers 
 To estimate the structural parameters of the on-the-job learning model, we need 
several observations of workers in each firm. Recall that we do as if the more capable worker 
in a given firm takes up the teaching role, and then estimate the distance to this teacher. We 
then make the following selections to the initial samples (similar for each country). 
 First, we restrict the samples to the firms which have information on at least four 
workers. Second, as our modelling framework is in discrete time, we decide to exclude all the 
workers having less than one year of tenure in the current firm. In so doing, it may be that we 
underestimate the rate of knowledge diffusion within the firm, if we assume that the learning-
by-watching process is very efficient once entering the firm (and there is less to learn from 
colleagues a couple of months after). However, we also argue that the level of earnings is 
unlikely to increase just after being hired and before reaching one year of tenure, even if there 
is a rise in the worker’s productivity due to learning from others. Finally, we drop from the 
sample all the observations with missing values or outliers. 
 The final samples are described in Table 1. This leaves us with samples comprising 
7622 workers and 822 firms in Morocco, 1566 workers and 188 firms in Benin, and 1284 
workers and 180 firms in Senegal. Owing to the large size of its sample, the FACS Moroccan 
data are expected to be much more informative. More than 75% of workers are employed in 
firms with 10 completed individual questionnaires. The same proportions are respectively 
equal to 48.5% in Benin and to 31.9% in Senegal. At the same time, the proportion of workers 
belonging to firms with information on less than 7 respondents is much higher in Senegal than 
in Benin (respectively 43.9% instead of 18%)9.  
Insert Table 1 here 
 The questionnaires of the different surveys allow us to construct identical human 
capital indicators for the workers in Benin, Morocco, and Senegal. We compute for each 
respondent the number of years of completed schooling, the number of years of experience 
off the current firm and the number of years of tenure in the incumbent firm. All these 
variables provide good controls for the potential advantage on the labour markets. We further 
construct a dummy variable which is equal to one when the worker has received formal on-
the-job training in the past. Nevertheless, owing to data constraints, this training is off the 
current job in the case of Morocco, but in the current firm for Benin and Senegal. Finally, we 
                                                 
9
 The distribution of firms by number of employees is characterized by a U-shaped profile in Senegal. 
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add two demographic variables, i.e. a dummy for gender and a dummy for whether the 
individual is married or not10. 
 In Table 2, we present some descriptive statistics related to the different covariates 
introduced into the earnings equations. A first result is that the Moroccan workers are on 
average the least educated. While the Moroccan employees show on average 8.7 years of 
education, their Beninese and Senegalese counterparts exhibit 9.4 and 10.3 years of schooling 
respectively. This is surprising because Sub-Saharan African countries are often believed to 
be less endowed in human capital as compared to North African ones. An explanation is that 
an overwhelming proportion of poorly educated individuals actually work in the informal 
sectors of Benin and Senegal (see DIAL, 2007). The latter are thus not in the sample design of 
the ICA surveys, as the data we use stem from formal manufacturing firms and their workers. 
The formal private sector in Senegal and Benin, highly selective, might be in fact reserved to 
the most educated workers. This is probably less true for Morocco where uneducated workers 
are also found in significant proportion in garment firms for instance.  
Insert Table 2 here 
 Another explanation may certainly be found in the proportion of females in the three 
surveys. It is well known that girls face lower educational achievement than boys, especially 
in developing countries. Interestingly, the proportion of women amounts to 40% in the case of 
Morocco, while these proportions are around 15% in the Beninese and Senegalese cases 
(respectively 13.9% and 16%). Nevertheless, we would like to stress that the specific gender 
composition of the Moroccan subsample is not so influential when explaining the lower 
education observed in that country. Indeed, while the mean number of years of schooling is 
equal to 8.8 among men, it is only slightly lower among women, equal to 8.5 years. Another 
finding on demographic characteristics is that the proportion of married workers is nearly the 
same in Benin and Senegal. It is lower in Morocco, but with a different definition. 
 In terms of work experience, the workers of the three samples have nearly the same 
amount of potential experience off the current firm, which stands at more than 12 years. 
Tenure in the current firm is on average higher for the Senegalese workers (8.9 years), while 
the Beninese are the least tenured workers (6.0 years). Finally, we note that in Senegal 
workers received in higher proportion formal job training in the incumbent firm as compared 
                                                 
10
 In order to ensure perfect comparability of the variables used in the model, this variable is approximated in the 
case of Morocco where the marital status was not collected from the workers. Instead, we use the fact of having 
declared children. In Morocco, it is reasonable to assume that all individuals who have declared children are (or 
have been) married because of the social norms in force.  
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to their Beninese counterparts (35% versus 20%). The figure is much lower in Morocco, but it 
relates to a formal job training episode off the current firm.  
 To summarize, we evidence quite similar profiles for the workers in the three 
countries, the two main differences stemming from education and female composition 
(respectively lower and higher in Morocco than in Benin and Senegal). As returns to on-the-
job learning are expected to depend on both workers’ and firms’ characteristics, we now 
further investigate the differences in the composition of the firms. 
 
3.3. Firm heterogeneity 
 For the sake of comparability, it matters to know whether there are any differences in 
the characteristics of the firms11. In Table 3, we summarize the descriptive statistics of the 
final samples of selected firms for each country.  
Insert Table 3 here 
For Morocco, 40.9% of the 822 firms are small and medium-sized plants with less 
than 50 permanent employees. Firms with more than 150 permanent employees represent 
23% of the firm sample. Most of these firms are found in the textile and garment sectors 
(60.3%). More than half of these firms are exporting companies, therefore submitted to strong 
market competition, especially in the garment sector. However, less than 5 percent of the 
sample of firms can be described as ‘multinationals’, i.e. with more than 75% foreign capital. 
Note that 62 percent of the firms have positive profits (hereafter ‘profitable’ firms). 
For Benin, the 188 firms are mostly located in the region of Cotonou (69%), the 
economic capital, a share close to the geographical distribution of the formal firms of Benin 
(World Bank, 2005b). More than 84% of them are small firms with less than 50 employees. 
Large-sized firms represent only 8% of the firm sample. Another difference with the 
Moroccan sample lies in the sectoral distribution, which is less concentrated with 20.6% of 
plants being in the agro-industry sector, 18.8% in the sector of furniture and 21.5% in the 
paper industry. Foreign companies are also very few (8%) but profitable firms are on the 
contrary predominant (92%). 
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 It also matters for the estimation strategy. If there are very similar firms in the three countries, then one could 
consider the possibility of pooling all the observations and estimate a single regression. However, this is clearly 
not the case with the available data sets. 
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The Senegalese sample represents well the actual distribution of jobs and firms in the 
manufacturing sector of Senegal (World Bank, 2005a). The firm size is quite similar to that of 
the Moroccan sample, with 52% of the 180 plants being small and medium-sized companies. 
Large-sized firms are also found in relatively fair proportion (21%). Firms in agro-industry 
are predominant (34%), the second most important sector being the industry of paper, closely 
followed by the textile and leather firms (10%). There are slightly more foreign owned 
companies in the Senegalese sample (15%), while profitable firms are also well represented 
(84%). 
To conclude, while the samples of workers look alike in many ways across the three 
countries, the firm samples are made of very different types of firms, with distinct sizes, 
belonging to quite different sectors of activity. This justifies taking care of this firm 
heterogeneity with cautious in the empirical strategy. Besides, in terms of the few principal 
firm characteristics mentioned above (notably size and sectoral distribution), the Senegalese 
and Moroccan firm samples exhibit more similarities, while the Beninese sample mainly 
differs due to the size of its firms, which are essentially small companies.  
 
4. Econometric specification 
 We turn to a structural econometric analysis to recover the values of the different 
parameters of interest. We first consider equation (4) and then show how to add the impact of 
self-learning into the estimation strategy. By taking the logarithm of th , we get: 
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In a setting with only learning-by-watching, we get a human capital earnings function which 
depends on the human capital of both the worker’s initial stock and the most qualified worker. 
It is also non-linear in both the rate of knowledge diffusion and tenure, so that the appropriate 
econometric approach is to rely on non-linear least squares. 
 Suppose that the initial earning (when entering the firm) is not observed. We can then 
approximate the level 0h  using a Mincerian earnings function. We introduce into the earnings 
function both years of education and years of experience outside the firm in a quadratic way. 
Several studies have indeed shown that returns to education are convex in African countries12. 
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 The assumption of convex returns to human capital seems important. Taking into account a linear form for the 
returns to education when the “true” profile is convex is likely to lead to an overestimated value of the rate of 
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We denote by s , e  and t  respectively years of education, years of experience off the firm 
and tenure. We express 0h  as: 
( )24322100 exp eessh ααααα ++++=      (8) 
since 0=t  by definition when entering the firm. Assume now that we can perfectly observe 
the most qualified worker to whom each individual is exposed to. Following the same 
approach, we can rely on a Mincerian earnings function to approximate the level H . With S , 
E  and T  respectively years of education, years of experience outside the firm and tenure for 
the most qualified worker and using quadratic profiles for these three covariates, it follows:   
( )2652432210exp TTEESSH ααααααα ++++++=    (9) 
 A difficulty with the data is that we have no information on the most productive 
worker who may be imitated by each individual. Such observation would require a description 
of student-teacher interactions within establishments. To overcome this shortcoming, we 
follow the method of Destré and Nordman (2002) and Destré et alii (2007). There are then 
two important assumptions. First, as we have matched employer-employee data and observe a 
random sample of employees from the same firm, we consider the whole set of employees for 
each firm and suppose that the most qualified worker within the firm is the one with the 
highest characteristics recorded in the survey13. Second, as we are not sure that an individual 
is really subject to the influence of the most qualified worker (as measured with the data), we 
account for a distance indicator between the maximum position and the individual situation. 
 Formally, this means that for an exogenous covariate denoted by X  for the most 
productive worker and by x  for the selected individual, we suppose that the characteristic of 
the teacher is such that: 
xXX xx )1( δδ −+=         (10) 
with xδ  a parameter to be estimated ( 10 ≤≤ xδ ). It measures the relative distance between 
the individual and the most capable worker within the firm. xδ  takes the value 0 if the 
individual has no possibility of learning from others and the value 1 if his/her most qualified 
teacher corresponds effectively to the worker having the biggest X  of the firm’s sub-sample. 
This implies that there are three parameters of relative distance to estimate, i.e. sδ , eδ  and tδ . 
                                                                                                                                                        
knowledge diffusion, since workers will benefit less from the rewards of their own personal characteristics when 
estimating the model. 
13
 In that sense, this means that we tend to underestimate the rate of learning-by-watching. Indeed, there may be 
even more productive workers within the firms, who have not been interviewed during the survey process. 
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After some calculations, we finally deduce the following non-linear form for the earnings 
equation under learning-by-watching: 
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where Z  is a set of control variables, β  is the corresponding vector of estimates, and ε  is a 
random perturbation. We estimate equation (11) using non-linear least squares (NLSQ) to get 
the coefficients of both the parameters and the explanatory variables. Let us briefly discuss 
identification issues. Clearly, the parameters 0α , 1α , 2α , 3α , 4α , sδ  and eδ  are identified 
according to the data. However, since we have only two estimates for tδα5  and 26 tδα , this 
implies that we cannot recover the individual values of the three coefficients 5α , 6α  and tδ . 
 A very similar strategy is used to estimate the model with both self-learning and 
learning-by-watching. There is now an additional parameter to estimate, i.e. g . From (6), we 
can express thln  as a function of 0ln h , tg)1ln( +  and a third term, more complex, which 
depends on the ratio 00 / hH , n  and g . The term 0H  is defined as in (9). Then, using (8) and 
(10), we obtain a non-linear form which is very similar to (11), except that the log earnings 
equation is now a function of an additional term tg)1ln( +  and that both n  and g  affect the 
exponential expression corresponding to 00 / hH . 
 While the estimation of both non-linear models is quite straightforward using NLSQ, a 
difficulty stems from the fact that we cannot model unobserved individual heterogeneity as 
the three data sets are cross-sectional. However, owing to the importance of the work 
environment in which workers are placed, which is more or less favourable to learning by 
watching other colleagues, it seems important to control for firm heterogeneity. In theory, 
firm heterogeneity could be handled in our setting. As we have information on several 
workers per firm, we can control for such heterogeneity in Mincerian earnings linear 
regressions through the use of fixed effects models. 
 The problem is much more complex when estimating (11). As the extended earnings 
equations are intrinsically highly non linear, we cannot control for firm heterogeneity using 
firm fixed effects. A possibility would be simply to add dummy variables for each firm, but 
the large number of firms in our data clearly rules out the possibility of using this method. 
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Another strategy to temper the effects of firm heterogeneity consists in adding a large number 
of control variables to our regressions. In this paper, we rely on an alternative strategy to 
control for unobserved firm heterogeneity which is likely to bias the estimated coefficients 
and rely on a factor analysis following Muller and Nordman (2004) and Jellal et alii (2007). 
We proceed in the following way. 
Our approach consists of summarising the main statistical information on the firms’ 
characteristics using first a multivariate analysis and then introducing the computed principal 
components (factors) into the earnings functions deriving from this analysis. Using factors 
may be seen as a further step with respect to those studies which have added mean firm 
variables into earnings functions, individual characteristics being controlled for. With respect 
to firm fixed effects, the factors are expected to pick up the impact of more qualitative 
characteristics of the firms. Specifically, we use a principal component analysis (PCA) to 
summarise the information about the surveyed companies14. This method is based on the 
calculation of the inertia axes for a cloud of points that represents the data in table format. As 
long as the computed factors account for most of the firm heterogeneity bias, this approach 
allows us to obtain consistent estimates close to those of the fixed effect estimator. The 
complete list, definitions and descriptive statistics of the firms’ characteristics introduced in 
the PCA appear in Table 2. 
 In the case of Morocco, the first ten inertia axes, defined as the estimated factors 
which are linear components of all the firm’s characteristics, concentrate a large proportion of 
the total variance of the original variables (63%). This reflects therefore a fair amount of the 
relevant information about the firm’s characteristics15. For the two other countries, Benin and 
Senegal, firm heterogeneity seems to be greater according to very basic descriptive statistics. 
We thus choose to rely on twelve factors which concentrate respectively 58% and 55% of the 
total variance of the firm variables.  
 The correlation coefficients of the firms’ characteristics with the factors are used for 
the interpretation of the computed factors. The ten first factors are closely associated with the 
firms’ sectoral belonging and size (factors 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9 for Morocco, factors 1, 4, 6, 7 and 
10 for Benin, factors 5, 7 and 10 for Senegal), the firms’ performances such as their sales, 
production and profitability (factors 1 and 10 for Morocco, factors 1, 3 and 8 for Benin and 1, 
                                                 
14
 In a principal component analysis, a set of variables is transformed into orthogonal components, which are 
linear combinations of the variables and have maximum variance subject to being uncorrelated with one another. 
Typically, the first few components account for a large proportion of the total variance of the original variables, 
and hence can be used to summarize the original data. 
15
 The detailed results of the three factor analyses (one for each country) are not reported here to save space and 
are available from the authors upon request. 
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2 and 8 for Senegal), their labour intensity and workforce composition such as whether 
production, skilled, or executives workers are dominant (factors 3, 6 and 8 for Morocco, 6, 7 
and 9 for Benin and Senegal)16. Hence, the ten factors reflect a wide range of firm 
characteristics that can mainly be summarised by the sector affiliation, size, performances, 
and workforce composition. 
 
5. Econometric results 
5.1. Basic earnings regressions 
For the sake of comparability, we begin by estimating earnings equations with a set of 
individual demographic and labour characteristics as control variables. We wonder then 
whether controlling for firm heterogeneity has an impact or not on our findings. Under the 
assumption that both 0=n  and 0=g , we estimate the earnings functions using simple OLS 
regressions. The dependent variable is defined as the log of the hourly earnings, which is 
computed as the ratio of monthly earnings divided by the number of worked hours per month. 
The corresponding results are in Table 4. 
Insert Table 4 here 
 In panel A, we describe the estimates obtained without control for firm heterogeneity. 
Models (1A), (2A) and (3A), respectively for Morocco, Benin and Senegal, include as 
regressors education and off the firm work experience along with their squared values, and 
three dummy variables for being female, married and the receipt of formal job training. The 
different regressions also include dummy variables related to occupations17. For all three 
countries, the results exhibit a convex profile in years of education and a concave profile in 
off the firm experience, except in Senegal where the latter is insignificant. These increasing 
marginal returns to education are expected results for Africa.  
Interestingly, this finding contradicts much of the comparative studies on the rates of 
return to education across countries which often use a linear in education specification of the 
earnings function (see Trostel et alii, 2002). However, constant or decreasing rates are more 
and more challenged in both developed and developing countries and non-linearities (mostly 
                                                 
16
 Other important firm characteristics are their risk of lost in the business due to workforce reliability (factors 3, 
4 and 8 for Morocco, 2 and 5 for Benin, 3 and 4 for Senegal) and the firms’ general features such as their 
vocation to export and status of ownership (factors 1 and 4 for Morocco, 1 and 4 for Benin and 5 for Senegal). 
17
 As they are not immediately comparable, we do no report the coefficients associated to occupations in Table 4. 
There are 9 occupational dummies in Morocco, and 6 occupational dummies in Benin and Senegal. 
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convexity) in the returns to education have been recently put forward by some studies on 
Africa (Bigsten et alii, 2000, Schultz, 2004, Söderbom et alii, 2006, Kuepie et alii, 2006). 
This result goes against the traditional model of human capital accumulation whereby the 
marginal return to education is assumed to be constant or even decreasing. When estimating 
the learning model, we structurally take into account this non-linear profile in education and 
assess its role on the returns to informal training on earnings.  
Concerning the other covariates, we find curiously that the gender dummy is only 
significant in Morocco. In that country, Nordman and Wolff (2007) have evidenced using 
quantile regressions the presence of a glass ceiling effect, such that the gender earnings gap is 
higher at the top of the earnings distribution than at the bottom. The fact that there is no 
gender difference in Benin and Senegal is somewhat surprising, but this result may be due to 
the low number of female workers in the corresponding samples. Being married has a positive 
effect in the three countries, and the receipt of formal training (which is treated as exogenous) 
only matters in Morocco. Finally, we note that the values of the R² in the regressions are 
reasonably high (around 0.4), but there are less significant explanatory variables in Senegal.  
 In columns (1B), (2B) and (3B), we add in the list of covariates the years of tenure in 
the firm and rely on a cubic form18. Several comments are in order. First, this additional 
covariate does not really affect the previous estimates, except the marital status whose effect 
is now much lower. Second, the squared and cubic tenure terms are only significant in 
Morocco, while they turn to be insignificant both in Benin and Senegal19. Third, we evidence 
a U-shaped profile for the returns to years of tenure in the current firm without control for 
firm heterogeneity in Morocco and Benin, while the shape is continuously decreasing in 
Senegal. This result is of interest as it stands in contrast with the standard Mincerian earnings 
function, which relies on a quadratic profile for years in tenure, so that the returns to tenure 
are necessarily linearly decreasing.  
Fourth, we find lower returns to years of tenure in Morocco than in Benin and 
Senegal. The returns to tenure remain rather flat in the former country, equal to 2% after 
either 5, 10 or 20 years of tenure. These returns amount to 4%, 3% and 3% in Benin and 4%, 
3% and 2% in Senegal respectively after 5, 10 and 20 years of tenure20. Fifth, we find that it 
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 Murphy and Welch (1990) show for the US that more flexible forms of tenure in the earnings function, such as 
third or fourth order polynomials, better fit to the data.  
19
 We have experimented alternative profiles for the effect of years of experience, in particular quadratic and 
quartic, but these alternative profiles provide a worse fit of the data.  
20
 It is interesting to compare our results with those found in Anglophone African countries with similar data 
sets. For instance, Bigsten et alii (2000) obtain lower rates of return to tenure, though it is difficult to compare 
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matters to control for unobserved heterogeneity. In the three countries, we evidence that the 
returns to tenure are lower when being calculated with either firm fixed effects or firm factors 
models (see Figure 1). However, there are some differences between these two approaches. In 
Morocco and to a lesser extent in Senegal, the shape of the returns curve is not really affected 
by the use of either fixed effects or firm factors21. Conversely, in Benin, the results are rather 
sensitive to the underlying method of control. The returns measured with firm factors are 
sometimes much lower than those measured with fixed effects, especially for intermediate 
numbers of years of tenure.  
Insert Figure 1 
We conclude from this estimation of earnings regressions that it matters to control for 
firm heterogeneity. While the firm factor strategy appears to perform well both in Morocco 
and in Senegal, the poor results evidenced in Benin may be the sign that there is more 
heterogeneity in this sample of firms, which may be due to the presence of very small 
production units in the sample. 
 
 5.2. Estimation of the learning-by-watching model 
 We now turn to the estimation of the structural model of learning-by-watching. For 
each country, the model is estimated twice using NLSQ, once with only individual covariates 
and once with inclusion of firm factors in order to pick up the impact of firm unobserved 
heterogeneity. The corresponding estimates are in Table 5. A first remark is that introducing 
the possibility of learning-by-watching colleagues does not really affect the coefficients 
obtained through Mincerian equations for education, experience off the firm, gender or 
marital status. For instance, being a woman reduces the hourly earnings in Morocco by 7.8% 
with the Mincerian specification (without firm controls), and by 7.3% with the possibility of 
informal on-the-job training. Interestingly, we still find a convex profile for years of 
schooling in the three countries, at least when firm heterogeneity is controlled for22. 
Conversely, years of experience off the firm exhibit a concave profile. 
                                                                                                                                                        
their estimates with ours with accuracy as their specifications differ somewhat from ours in that they use a 
quadratic term in tenure only. From their sample statistics and estimates, however, we can evaluate their rates at 
1.8% for Ghana at the sample mean (after 4 years of tenure), 0.2% for Kenya (after 7 years), 3.4% for Zambia 
(after 6 years) and 0.9% for Zimbabwe (after 9 years). 
21
 In Senegal, the two profiles are different for a number of years of tenure less than 5 or above 25. 
22
 Without firm factors, the squared term for education is not significant in Senegal and is negative, but only 
significant at the 10 percent level in Benin. 
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 Let us focus on the values of the structural parameters of the model. When firm 
heterogeneity is not controlled for, we find a significant value for n  in Morocco, Benin and 
Senegal. The parameter n  is always significant at the 1 percent level, meaning that the 
learning-by-watching mechanism described in the theoretical section is indeed operative in 
the selected countries. These results are in accordance with the previous findings reported in 
Chennouf et alii (1997) for Algeria and Canada, Nordman (2000) for Morocco and Mauritius, 
Destré and Nordman (2002) for Morocco, Tunisia and France and Destré (2003) for France. 
 However, we note some very important difference in the rate of knowledge diffusion 
within firm respectively in Morocco and Senegal and in Benin. While the parameter n  is 
comprised between 6% and 8% in the former group of countries, its value is much higher in 
Benin, equal to 58.5%. Two comments are in order. First, our rate of knowledge diffusion in 
Morocco is slightly lower than the estimated values found in Nordman (2000) and Destré and 
Nordman (2002), who have evidenced a rate of diffusion around 15%23. Second, it remains 
unclear why n  is so large in Benin. An explanation could lie in a more flexible mode of wage 
fixation in this country, albeit there is no clear support for this assumption. 
 In Figure 2, we show how the diffusion of the firm specific knowledge is sensitive to 
the parameter n . Specifically, we calculate the number of years of tenure which is requested 
to assimilate a given proportion of the knowledge of the firm. Denoting by ϑ  the share of the 
firm knowledge, it can easily be shown that the number of years t  to assimilate ϑ  is given by 
)1ln(/)1ln( nt +−−= ϑ . Hence, as clearly shown in Figure 2, a worker will get faster a given 
proportion of the firm knowledge when n  is important. For the sake of illustration, suppose 
that we seek the number of years in tenure to assimilate half of the firm knowledge. We find 
that t  is equal to 11.3 years in Morocco, 9.5 years in Senegal, but only 1.5 years in Benin. 
The requested years in tenure are respectively equal to 26.3, 18.9 and 3 when 8.0=ϑ . 
 It is of interest to investigate the pattern of sδ  and eδ . These parameters measure the 
relative distance which separates the average worker from the most qualified teacher inside 
the firm, respectively in terms of years of education and in terms of experience off the firm. 
We find that the educational distance is much lower in Morocco, as it is equal to 0.069. This 
explains in turn the low value which is found for n . As the average worker is rather close to 
                                                 
23
 Note that the sample used for Morocco in Nordman (2000) and Destré and Nordman (2002) is a non-
representative sample of workers in only two manufacturing sectors. Interestingly, results reported in Destré 
(2003) for a representative sample of French workers in the private sector, with n standing at about 5%, are 
closer to our estimates for Morocco and Senegal.  
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his/her most qualified teacher, the potential of learning-by-watching is less important. At the 
same time, the relative distance in terms of experience off the firm is not significant, as is the 
case in Benin. Conversely, the distance to the most educated teacher is much more important 
in Benin, with a coefficient of 0.548 and to a lower extent in Senegal (0.430). However, this 
potential of learning translates into rapid rise in earnings only in Benin. 
 Another point of interest relates to the role of firm unobserved heterogeneity. By 
neglecting the influential role of firm characteristics, it may be that we overestimate the rate 
of job-specific knowledge diffusion. This would be the case if there are some differences in 
wage policies among firms related to sectors of activity or to the size of the firm for instance. 
In model (1B), (2B) and (3B) of Table 5, we add in the country-specific regressions a set of 
firm factors obtained by the PCAs. 
Insert Table 5 here 
 The main conclusion is that controlling for firm characteristics does significantly 
reduce the value of the rate of knowledge diffusion. The magnitude of this coefficient is now 
twice lower both in Morocco and Senegal. It amounts to 3.6% for the former country and to 
3.5% for the latter, but the parameter is only significant in Morocco at the 10 percent level. In 
Benin, the rate of knowledge diffusion is also lower, 49.2% versus 58.5%. Nevertheless, a 
potential shortcoming with that country is that the firm factors approach appears less efficient 
to control for firm heterogeneity (see the above discussion). 
 Finally, we have computed the marginal returns to tenure in the learning-by-watching 
model. Of course, if workers have the opportunity to learn a lot from colleagues, they are 
expected to improve quickly their earnings and then the returns to tenure should exhibit a 
more convex profile. Doing as if the time variable t  is continuous, we first express equation 
(11) as ( )[ ] BAnh tt ++−+= −)1(11lnln , A  being the exponential term in (11) and B  a 
constant (these two terms are independent of t ). The derivative tht ∂∂ /ln  is then: 
( )An
nnA
t
h
t
t
t
−
−
+−+
++
=
∂
∂
)1(11
)1)(1ln(ln
           (12) 
which is clearly not linear in t  as with Mincerian earnings functions. We describe in Figure 3 
the profiles of returns to tenure. For each country, we compare the results from earnings 
regression with a cubic profile in tenure to those of learning-by-watching models, both 
without and with firm factors. 
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Insert Figure 3 here 
 In Benin, we find that the returns to informal training are very high, characterized by 
an unequal distribution over time. The benefits from learning-by-watching others are 
essentially reaped by workers just after hiring. The returns to tenure are strongly decreasing 
till five years of tenure. A quite similar profile, albeit less pronounced, is evidenced in 
Senegal. Owing to the opportunities of imitating others, the returns are more important just 
after being hired with the learning-by-watching model. In Morocco, the returns curves of the 
Mincerian and learning-by-watching model cross at around 20 years in tenure24. Finally, in 
Senegal, the returns to tenure are more convex with the Mincerian specification, so that there 
are fewer differences with the learning-by-watching model. The possibility of imitating other 
colleagues conveys again an economic benefit in the first years of the career (at least with no 
firm factors). 
 
 5.3. Learning from others or learning by oneself? 
 In the previous estimations, we do as if workers cannot acquire any job knowledge by 
themselves. We now relax this constraint and estimate the extended model of on-the-job 
learning given by equation (6), with learning from both others and oneself. Owing to the 
particular pattern of knowledge diffusion among the Beninese firms, we restrict our attention 
in what follows to the Moroccan and Senegalese samples. The model is again estimated using 
non-linear least squares, without or with firm factors, and we present the various estimates in 
Table 6. 
 For the sake of comparison, we begin by considering a simple model of human capital 
formation with no possibility of learning-by-watching, i.e. 0=n . The dynamics of human 
capital is simply tt hgh )1(1 +=+ , so that we easily deduce 0)1( hgh tt += . Taking the 
logarithm of this expression and assuming that ( )24322100 exp eessh ααααα ++++=  as in (8), 
we estimate the following regression25:  
εβααααα ++++++++= Zeessgtht 2432210)1ln(ln        (13) 
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 We also note that in Morocco the returns to tenure are slightly lower with the  learning-by-watching model 
with firm factors. As the rate of knowledge diffusion is lower in that case, there are fewer opportunities for 
workers to learn quickly from others (and then less economic benefits). 
25
 Clearly, equation (12) is a restrictive case of (11). It is obtained when the rate of knowledge diffusion is equal 
to zero, meaning that the characteristics of the most qualified worker are in fact those of the considered worker 
(there is nothing to learn from others). 
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It is straightforward to estimate this model with only learning-by-oneself. We find very 
similar values for the parameter g  in both countries26. It is equal to 1.3% per year in Morocco 
and to 1.1% in Senegal. Results lead to somewhat different findings once accounting for the 
possibility of imitation within the firm.  
In the case of Senegal, we find a more important value for g  with the extended 
learning model (columns 2B and 2C). Indeed, this parameter takes a value of 2.1% without 
firm factors and 1.8% with firm factors. At the same time, we fail to evidence a significant 
value for the rate of knowledge diffusion. In models (2B) and (2C), the parameter n  is still 
positive and is equal to 0.041 once controlling for firm heterogeneity. A similar result was 
found with the pure learning-by-watching specification, with an insignificant parameter of 
0.035. A last remark, which suggests that there is still something to learn from colleagues 
despite the insignificant rate of job-specific knowledge diffusion, is that the relative distance 
separating the average worker from the most qualified worker remains highly significant. In 
the meantime, the distance is quite low, around 0.14 in presence of firm factors.  
 In Morocco, introducing the possibility of learning-by-imitation leads to higher returns 
to learning-by-oneself, just like in the Senegalese case. The parameter g  is indeed equal to 
3.2% without firm factors and to 5% with firm factors. At the same time, while n  turns out to 
be insignificant in model (1B), it appears significant at the 1 percent level and equal to 4% in 
model (1C) which controls for firm heterogeneity. Among Moroccan firms, there is thus a real 
potential benefit of learning from colleagues and this learning-by-watching process also 
conveys higher benefits to self-learning. Finally, we note that the rate of diffusion of 4% in 
the learning-by-oneself and others model (2B) of Table 6 is very close to the value of 3.5% 
found in the pure learning-by-watching model (1B) of Table 5. 
Finally, it is worth comparing our results with those of Destré and Nordman (2002)27. 
For Morocco, these authors have found that the learning-by-oneself process is the only 
component of informal training that has a significant impact on earnings. Conversely, they 
exhibit both a high rate of knowledge diffusion and a significant impact of learning-by-
oneself (1.9%) for Tunisian workers. Hence, their respective findings for Morocco and 
Tunisia look like ours in the case of Senegal and Morocco. In Destré and Nordman (2002), 
the argument advocated to explain this difference is that the distance with the most educated, 
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 We have also estimated the parameter g in Benin. We get a value of 1.3%, significant at the 1 percent level, 
which is then very similar to the estimates found in Morocco and Senegal.  
27
 Recall that they use small non-representative samples of manufacturing firms in Morocco and Tunisia. 
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i.e. sS − , in the Tunisian firms is on average higher than in the Moroccan ones, while the 
number of years of schooling is equivalent in both of the cases studied. These statistics may 
justify the possibilities that learning by imitation are much more important for the Tunisian 
employees.  
 In our case, however, these statistics do not seem to be relevant explanations for the 
divergence of learning effects in the Moroccan and Senegalese cases. While sS −  amounts 
on average to 5.5 years for the Moroccan workers, it is 6.7 years in Senegal. Besides, the 
average education is slightly higher for the Senegalese (see subsection 3.2). Similarly, the 
distance to the most experienced worker is respectively 13.9 versus 14.3 years, again higher 
for the Senegalese where the benefits of the imitation process are found to be null. Hence, the 
fact that there are no benefits from learning-by-watching in the Senegalese case should be 
explained by other factors, beyond the workers’ human capital endowments.  
 A first explanation could lie in strong rigidity in the fixation of wages. Another 
explanation may refer to the work organisational features within firms, the environment of 
employees contributing to intensification of the learning-by-watching process. For instance, 
more compartmentalized firms may leave fewer places to the emergence of peer effects. 
Unfortunately, we lack relevant information on the firms to know whether Senegalese firms 
are more partitioned28. Finally, the important presence of temporary workers in firms, or firms 
with high labour turnover, could also explain why the diffusion of knowledge is not efficient. 
While the ratio of the number of full time temporary workers to the total number of full time 
permanent employees amounts to 27% in the Moroccan firms, it is much higher in the 
Senegalese firms (67%). The underlying higher turnover may well explain the divergence of 
knowledge diffusion efficiency between these two countries. 
 
6. Concluding comments 
Using matched worker-firm data from Benin, Morocco and Senegal, we have 
developed and estimated in this paper a model of on-the-job learning which accounts for two 
forms of informal learning within firms, i.e. learning-by-watching and learning-by-oneself. 
Our estimates highlight contrasted effects of informal training on earnings. The interest of the 
                                                 
28
 However, indicators of the supervision rates in firms are informative. Note that while the proportion of firms 
with a share of managers higher than 10 percent of the total employees amounts to 11% for Morocco, it is much 
higher for Senegal with 39%. 
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model presented consists in the estimation not only of the earnings effects of the self-learning 
process, but also of the speed of knowledge diffusion within firms.  
 We note some very important difference in the rate of knowledge diffusion 
respectively in Morocco and Senegal and in Benin. While the rate is comprised between 6% 
and 8% in the former group of countries, its value is much higher in Benin (above 50%). Less 
time is hence required in that country for an average worker to learn a given proportion of the 
firm’s knowledge. Another finding is that controlling for firm characteristics significantly 
reduces the value of the rate of knowledge diffusion. Interestingly, the rates of return to 
learning-by-oneself are affected by the possibility of learning-by-watching. Both in Morocco 
and Senegal, the benefits of learning-by-oneself are enhanced, but the potential benefit of 
learning from colleagues disappears in the latter country. Moroccan estimates exhibit 
significant economic returns to both learning-by-watching and self-learning. 
From our results, it turns out that the overall return to human capital explaining the 
remuneration of a given worker involves personal skill characteristics, including individual 
abilities to learn, but also firms’ knowledge characteristics. It seems then important to 
consider these two sources of returns from human capital simultaneously because education 
policies and policies promoting vocational training may affect both worker’s human capital 
and firm’s human capital environment. In particular, assessing policies without accounting for 
educational and knowledge externalities within firms may largely under-estimate the benefits 
of such policies. 
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Table 1. Composition of the sample 
 
Morocco Benin Senegal 
Workers Firms Workers Firms Workers Firms 
Number of 
employees per 
firm N % N % N % N % N % N % 
4 40 0.5 10 1.2 28 1.8 7 3.7 128 10.0 32 17.8 
5 130 1.7 26 3.2 65 4.2 13 6.9 105 8.2 21 11.7 
6 180 2.4 30 3.6 84 5.4 14 7.4 156 12.1 26 14.4 
7 224 2.9 32 3.9 161 10.3 23 12.2 105 8.2 15 8.3 
8 320 4.2 40 4.9 216 13.8 27 14.4 200 15.6 25 13.9 
9 1008 13.2 112 13.6 252 16.1 28 14.9 180 14.0 20 11.1 
10 5720 75.0 572 69.6 760 48.5 76 40.4 410 31.9 41 22.8 
All 7622 100.0 822 100.0 1566 100.0 188 100.0 1284 100.0 180 100.0 
Sources: ICA Benin and Senegal, FACS Morocco. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the workers 
 
Variables Morocco Benin Senegal 
Log of hourly earnings 4.050 5.658 6.590 
 (0.616) (1.059) (0.885) 
Years of education 8.679 9.430 10.322 
 (5.428) (4.721) (5.661) 
Years of experience off the firm 12.766 12.377 12.747 
 (9.300) (7.969) (9.280) 
Years of tenure in the firm 7.435 6.030 8.981 
 (6.305) (5.418) (7.870) 
Female 0.398 0.139 0.160 
 (0.490) (0.346) (0.367) 
Married 0.518 0.687 0.673 
 (0.500) (0.464) (0.469) 
Formal training 0.041 0.198 0.355 
 (0.199) (0.399) (0.479) 
Number of observations 7622 1566 1284 
Sources: ICA Benin and Senegal, FACS Morocco. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the firms 
 
Variable names Definitions Morocco Benin Senegal 
  mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
secteur1 Agro industry / Garment for Morocco (1 if yes) 0.370 0.483 0.206 0.405 0.345 0.476 
secteur2 Chemicals and related products / Food for Morocco (1 if yes) 0.098 0.297 0.049 0.216 0.097 0.295 
secteur3 Materials for construction / Textile for Morocco (1 if yes)  0.233 0.423 0.049 0.215 0.079 0.271 
secteur4 Furniture / Leather for Morocco (1 if yes) 0.078 0.268 0.188 0.391 0.034 0.182 
secteur5 Metallic products / Electricals for Morocco (1 if yes) 0.044 0.205 0.112 0.316 0.093 0.290 
secteur6 Industry of paper and paper products / Chemicals for Morocco (1 if yes) 0.091 0.288 0.215 0.411 0.120 0.325 
secteur7 Plastics products (1 if yes) 0.086 0.280 0.012 0.110 0.078 0.268 
secteur8 Textiles and leather (1 if yes)   0.019 0.137 0.101 0.302 
secteur9 Wood (1 if yes)   0.143 0.350 0.046 0.209 
secteur10 Other (1 if yes)   0.006 0.080 0.007 0.083 
export Exporting firms (1 if yes) 0.571 0.495 0.221 0.415 0.558 0.497 
pfemme Share of female employees 0.570 2.233 0.128 0.180 0.103 0.124 
size Firm size (1: <50 employees, 2: 50<=employees<150, 3:employees>=150) 1.820 0.778 1.237 0.586 1.688 0.796 
effecpermplein Total number of permanent full-time employees 126.8     202.1 25.240 52.556 96.805 270.139 
qualdominant Qualified employees being dominant occupation (1 if yes) 0.328 0.470 0.514 0.500 0.203 0.403 
pqual_mis Qualified employees being dominant occupation missing (1 if yes)     0.038 0.192 
nonqualdominant Non qualified employees being dominant occupation (1 if yes)   0.098 0.297 0.285 0.452 
pnonqual_mis Share of Unskilled Workers missing (1 if yes)   0.008 0.087 0.038 0.192 
pcadredireleve Share of managers higher than 10% of the total employees (1 if yes) 0.110 0.313 0.734 0.442 0.391 0.488 
pcadredir_mis Share of managers missing (1 if yes)     0.038 0.192 
labintensive Highly labour intensive firms (1 if labour costs > 75% total costs) 0.023 0.151 0.046 0.210 0.003 0.056 
labintensity Labour intensity 0.265 0.201 0.143 0.406 0.116 0.152 
labintensity_mis Labour intensity missing (1 if yes)   0.522 0.500 0.215 0.411 
massesal_tot_mis Total wage costs missing (1 if yes)     0.202 0.401 
etrangere Firms with more than 75% foreign owned (1 if yes) 0.042 0.200 0.080 0.271 0.151 0.358 
Klocal % of local firm capital   86.700 29.978 80.861 36.119 
Klocal_mis % of local firm capital missing     0.004 0.062 
profit Profitable firms (1 if yes) 0.635 0.481 0.927 0.261 0.845 0.362 
profit_mis Profitable firms missing (1 if yes)   0.192 0.394 0.643 0.479 
psalairepiece Share of piece-rate pay for non qualified employees 0.005 0.061     
pabsenteism Share of days lost due to absenteism 0.024 0.058     
pgreve Share of days lost due to strike 0.002 0.025     
pgreve_mis Share of days lost due to strike missing (1 if yes) 0.229 0.420     
ppertevols Share of days lost due to theft 0.003 0.012     
ppertevols~s Share of days lost due to theft missing (1 if yes) 0.218 0.413     
daylostgreve Number of days lost due to strike   0.520 4.918 0.134 1.410 
daylostgreve_mis Number of days lost due to strike missing (1 if yes)   0.110 0.313 0.061 0.239 
daylostemeutes Number of days lost due to riots   0.223 1.703 0.234 1.199 
daylostemeutes_mis Number of days lost due to riots missing (1 if yes)   0.104 0.305 0.061 0.239 
daylostfamille Number of days lost due to family events   1.377 5.574 1.305 7.242 
daylostfamille_mis Number of days lost due to family events missing (1 if yes)   0.094 0.292 0.099 0.299 
valpertevols Value of losts due to thefts, vandalism or arson     0.529 1.600 
valpertevols_mis Value of losts due to thefts, vandalism or arson missing     0.129 0.336 
pertevols Has suffer losts due to thefts, vandalism or arson   0.193 0.395   
pertevols_mis Has suffer losts due to thefts, vandalism or arson missing   0.005 0.071   
formation Firm provided (on- or off-the-job) formal training (1 if yes)   0.328 0.470 0.393 0.489 
jourformestot Number of days of provided formal training 130.60* 1992.86 30.033 127.531 18.777 66.082 
sale Sales of the firm the year preceding the survey** 2.5E+04 5.1E+04 1.7E+09 9.2E+09 4.2E+09 1.4E+10 
sale_mis Sales of the firm the year preceding the survey missing   0.032 0.176 0.090 0.286 
prod Value of the production the year preceding the survey** 2.3E+04 4.5E+04 5.1E+08 2.2E+09 8.8E+08 5.0E+09 
prod_mis Value of the production the year preceding the survey missing   0.186 0.390 0.640 0.480 
psyndic Share of unionised employees   0.035 0.163 0.342 0.402 
psyndic_mis Share of unionised employees missing   0.021 0.144 0.048 0.214 
pnoschool Share of uneducated workers in permanent employees   0.096 0.201 0.107 0.165 
pprimaire Share of primary school workers in permanent employees   0.206 0.222 0.256 0.257 
pcollege Share of middle school workers in permanent employees   0.342 0.268 0.180 0.195 
plycee Share of high school workers in permanent employees   0.190 0.204 0.152 0.178 
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puniv Share of higher educated workers in permanent employees   0.147 0.178 0.125 0.131 
propmoins30 Share of <30 years old workers   0.345 0.234 0.203 0.210 
prop30_45 Share of 30-45 years old workers   0.515 0.228 0.493 0.255 
propplus45 Share of >45 years old workers    0.130 0.154 0.212 0.213 
 Number of observations 822 188 180 
Sources: ICA Benin and Senegal, FACS Morocco. 
*: Number of on-the-job day trainees. 
**: in local currencies. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. To avoid dropping firm observations with missing values in the factor analysis, we use the modified 
zero-order regression method described in Maddala (1977): observations with missing information are set to zero and we include in the 
analysis a dummy variable for the missing observations.  
The factor analysis (PCA) includes the following firm variables: 
Morocco: secteur1, secteur2, secteur3, secteur4, secteur5, secteur6, secteur7, export, pfemme, size, psalairepiece, qualdominant, 
pcadredireleve, labintensive, etrangere, profit, pabsenteism, pgreve, pgreve_mis, ppertevols, ppertevols_mis, jourformestot, sale, prod. 
Benin: secteur1, secteur2, secteur3, secteur4, secteur5, secteur6, secteur7, secteur8, secteur9, secteur10, export, pfemme, size, effecpermplein, 
qualdominant, nonqualdominant, pnonqual_mis, pcadredireleve, labintensive, labintensity, labintensity_mis, etrangere, Klocal, profit, 
profit_mis, daylostgreve, daylostgreve_mis, daylostemeutes, daylostemeutes_mis, daylostfamille, daylostfamille_mis, pertevols, 
pertevols_mis, formation, jourformestot, sale, sale_mis, prod, prod_mis, psyndic, psyndic_mis, pnoschool, pprimaire, pcollege, plycee, puniv, 
propmoins30, prop30_45, propplus45. 
Senegal: secteur1, secteur2, secteur3, secteur4, secteur5, secteur6, secteur7, secteur8, secteur9, secteur10, export, pfemme, size, 
qualdominant, pqual_mis, nonqualdominant, pnonqual_mis, pcadredireleve, pcadredir_mis, labintensive, labintensity, labintensity_mis, 
massesal_tot_mis, etrangere, Klocal, Klocal_mis, profit, profit_mis, daylostgreve, daylostgreve_mis, daylostemeutes, daylostemeutes_mis, 
daylostfamille, daylostfamille_mis, valpertevols, valpertevols_mis, formation, jourformestot, sale, sale_mis, prod, prod_mis, psyndic, 
psyndic_mis, pnoschool, pprimaire, pcollege, plycee, puniv, propmoins30, prop30_45, propplus45. 
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Table 4. Estimates of the log of hourly earnings 
 
A. Without controls of firm heterogeneity 
 
Morocco Benin Senegal Variables 
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) 
Constant 3.443*** 3.177*** 4.156*** 3.773*** 5.594*** 5.087*** 
 (34.55) (32.37) (35.03) (28.47) (52.73) (44.16) 
Years of education -0.018*** -0.006* 0.055*** 0.067*** 0.011 0.027** 
 (4.85) (1.80) (3.07) (3.82) (0.92) (2.39) 
Years of education ² (/10) 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 
 (11.43) (11.61) (3.04) (3.02) (2.72) (3.33) 
Years of experience off the firm 0.005** 0.016*** 0.041*** 0.056*** 0.007 0.025*** 
 (2.51) (8.27) (5.16) (6.99) (1.15) (4.08) 
Years of experience off the firm ² (/10) -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.002 -0.004** 
 (3.86) (6.38) (3.90) (5.02) (1.27) (2.51) 
Female -0.105*** -0.078*** -0.061 -0.061 -0.074 -0.016 
 (9.00) (6.84) (0.90) (0.92) (1.21) (0.28) 
Married 0.171*** 0.062*** 0.240*** 0.083 0.407*** 0.169*** 
 (14.12) (4.79) (4.72) (1.54) (9.45) (3.65) 
Receipt of formal training 0.260*** 0.263*** 0.069 0.030 0.086* 0.058 
 (9.50) (9.89) (1.24) (0.55) (1.86) (1.30) 
Years of tenure in the firm  0.034***  0.061***  0.050*** 
  (7.35)  (2.83)  (3.16) 
Years of tenure in the firm ² (/10)  -0.012***  -0.020  -0.009 
  (3.47)  (1.17)  (0.83) 
Years of tenure in the firm (/100)  0.003***  0.004  0.001 
  (3.53)  (1.07)  (0.44) 
Observations 7622 7622 1566 1566 1284 1284 
R-squared 0.43 0.46 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.48 
 
B. With controls of firm heterogeneity 
 
Morocco Benin Senegal Variables 
(1C) (1D) (2C) (2D) (3C) (3D) 
Constant 3.242*** 3.292*** 4.682*** 4.049*** 5.421*** 5.153*** 
 (41.21) (35.63) (39.01) (31.18) (54.05) (46.13) 
Years of education -0.002 -0.001 -0.027* 0.037** 0.011 0.020* 
 (0.71) (0.26) (1.67) (2.09) (1.12) (1.89) 
Years of education ² (/10) 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 
 (8.93) (8.64) (5.02) (3.39) (3.06) (3.39) 
Years of experience off the firm 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.025*** 0.047*** 0.013** 0.024*** 
 (8.62) (7.45) (3.74) (6.09) (2.54) (4.16) 
Years of experience off the firm ² (/10) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.004*** 
 (5.74) (5.38) (2.33) (4.18) (0.94) (2.59) 
Female -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.045 0.034 -0.032 0.035 
 (6.79) (5.89) (0.77) (0.51) (0.65) (0.61) 
Married 0.048*** 0.059*** 0.024 0.119** 0.081** 0.171*** 
 (4.64) (4.85) (0.55) (2.32) (2.11) (3.82) 
Receipt of formal training 0.024 0.134*** 0.014 0.042 0.089** 0.043 
 (0.86) (5.27) (0.23) (0.76) (2.30) (1.00) 
Years of tenure in the firm 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.034** 0.048*** 
 (8.47) (6.58) (2.99) (2.74) (2.31) (3.10) 
Years of tenure in the firm ² (/10) -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.040*** -0.024 -0.003 -0.014 
 (4.58) (3.32) (2.67) (1.45) (0.35) (1.31) 
Years of tenure in the firm (/100) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.005 -0.000 0.002 
 (3.86) (3.36) (2.87) (1.35) (0.23) (0.91) 
Observations 7622 7622 1566 1566 1284 1284 
R-squared 0.51 0.52 0.36 0.46 0.46 0.52 
Sources: ICA Benin and Senegal, FACS Morocco. 
Regressions (A) and (B) are OLS, (C) are fixed effects models, and (D) are OLS estimates with firm factors. Absolute value of t statistics are 
in parentheses, significance levels being respectively equal to 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). All regressions also include dummies for 
occupation. 
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Table 5. Structural estimates of the  learning-by-watching model 
 
Morocco Benin Senegal Variables 
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) 
Constant 3.260*** 3.365*** 2.964*** 3.951*** 4.854*** 5.216*** 
 (33.42) (36.47) (19.69) (26.83) (39.36) (45.94) 
Years of education -0.021*** -0.008* 0.142*** 0.015 0.065*** 0.004 
 (4.95) (1.95) (14.07) (0.73) (7.52) (0.32) 
Years of education ² (/10) 0.033*** 0.021*** -0.002* 0.039*** 0.002 0.025*** 
 (13.13) (8.96) (1.78) (4.01) (1.07) (4.14) 
Years of experience off the firm 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.053*** 0.043*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 
 (7.24) (5.88) (6.47) (5.25) (4.40) (4.87) 
Years of experience off the firm ² (/10) -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (5.67) (4.29) (4.71) (3.59) (2.89) (3.30) 
Female -0.073*** -0.064*** 0.020 0.033 0.009 0.056 
 (6.38) (5.82) (0.30) (0.48) (0.15) (1.00) 
Married 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.067 0.120** 0.191*** 0.183*** 
 (5.74) (6.14) (1.28) (2.37) (4.28) (4.22) 
Receipt of formal training 0.243*** 0.129*** 0.029 0.017 0.049 0.044 
 (9.13) (5.06) (0.53) (0.31) (1.13) (1.05) 
δs 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.548*** 0.054*** 0.430*** 0.142*** 
 (5.83) (2.69) (4.81) (4.28) (3.74) (3.07) 
δe 0.026 0.001 0.023* 0.009 0.150*** 0.120** 
 (1.19) (0.02) (1.78) (0.47) (2.75) (2.05) 
α5δt 0.014*** 0.019** 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.023** 0.025 
 (3.53) (2.42) (5.83) (4.34) (2.25) (1.41) 
α6δt² 0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.51) (0.79) (4.51) (3.17) (0.20) (0.70) 
n 0.063*** 0.036* 0.585*** 0.492** 0.076*** 0.035 
 (3.50) (1.90) (2.79) (2.17) (2.61) (1.45) 
Observations 7622 7622 1566 1566 1284 1284 
R-squared 0.46 0.52 0.42 0.47 0.50 0.53 
Sources: ICA Benin and Senegal, FACS Morocco. 
Regressions (A) and (B) are estimated using non-linear least squares, models (B) including firm factors. Absolute value of t statistics are in 
parentheses, significance levels being respectively equal to 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). All regressions also include dummies for 
occupation. 
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Table 6. Structural estimates of the learning by oneself and others model 
 
Morocco Senegal Variables 
(1A) (1B) (1C) (2A) (2B) (2C) 
Constant 2.324*** 3.187*** 3.298*** 4.200*** 5.028*** 5.190*** 
 (25.26) (32.54) (35.81) (45.48) (46.52) (51.32) 
Years of education -0.001 -0.008** -0.004 0.033*** 0.028* 0.017 
 (0.19) (2.12) (1.08) (3.03) (1.94) (1.22) 
Years of education ² (/10) 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 
 (8.51) (11.69) (9.04) (3.09) (3.32) (3.93) 
Years of experience off the firm 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.032*** 
 (7.13) (7.79) (7.47) (4.68) (5.67) (5.19) 
Years of experience off the firm ² (/10) -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (5.07) (6.23) (5.59) (2.82) (3.82) (3.31) 
Female -0.064*** -0.077*** -0.064*** 0.185*** 0.168*** 0.197*** 
 (5.82) (6.77) (5.81) (3.63) (3.24) (3.93) 
Married 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.187*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 
 (5.24) (4.73) (4.99) (4.16) (3.72) (3.82) 
Receipt of formal training 0.136*** 0.265*** 0.134*** 0.119*** 0.127*** 0.115*** 
 (5.32) (9.94) (5.26) (2.81) (2.96) (2.74) 
δs  0.376*** 0.228**  0.070*** 0.161** 
  (4.32) (1.98)  (3.26) (2.40) 
δe  0.761*** 0.247  0.084*** 0.107 
  (3.31) (1.50)  (2.91) (1.55) 
α5δt  0.050 -0.239***  -0.001 -0.018 
  (0.23) (2.88)  (0.09) (0.66) 
α6δt²  -0.015 0.005***  0.000 0.000 
  (1.12) (2.86)  (1.46) (0.79) 
n  0.012 0.040***  0.242 0.041 
  (1.11) (2.78)  (1.37) (1.28) 
g 0.013*** 0.032*** 0.050*** 0.011*** 0.021*** 0.018** 
 (19.42) (3.08) (3.60) (8.88) (3.65) (1.96) 
Observations 7622 7622 7622 1284 1284 1284 
R-squared 0.52 0.46 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.52 
Sources: ICA Benin and Senegal, FACS Morocco. 
All regressions are estimated using non-linear least squares, models (A) and (C) including firm factors. Absolute value of t statistics are in 
parentheses, significance levels being respectively equal to 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). All regressions also include dummies for 
occupation. 
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Figure 1. Rates of return to tenure – Mincer earnings regressions 
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Sources: ICA Benin and Senegal, FACS Morocco. 
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Figure 2. Time needed to accumulate the firm knowledge 
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  Sources: ICA Benin and Senegal, FACS Morocco. 
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Figure 3. Rates of return of tenure –  learning-by-watching models 
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  Sources: ICA Benin and Senegal, FACS Morocco. 
